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ORIGINAL ARTICLE
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Abstract
During the Cold War, Havana symbolised the struggle for national liberation in Latin
America. Yet in few other places on the island of Cuba did the Revolution’s visions of
development materialise as they did in the southern city of Cienfuegos. This article
examines why two half-finished nuclear reactors and a decaying ‘nuclear city’ still remain
in Cienfuegos. Through a comprehensive spatial and infrastructural transformation of
Cuba, the revolutionary government sought to remedy the evils of dependency and
unequal exchange. Cienfuegos, and its shifting place in the Cold War political economy,
demonstrates how a radical critique of urbanisation merged with the spatiality of
centralised energy infrastructure in the pursuit of ultimately-failed nuclear modernity.
The history of Cienfuegos draws the academic gaze away from Latin America’s
major cities to broaden the ‘geographies of theory’ in urban, energy and Latin
American studies.
Keywords: urbanisation; nuclear energy; infrastructure; unequal exchange; Cuban Revolution; Cold War
Travelling by ferry across the bay of Cienfuegos, I had the sense of being in a
strangely global and historical place. I was approaching a once colonial city, later
the epicentre of the Cuban Revolution’s visions for national development. To the
west towered the distillation columns of a Soviet-built oil refinery, now funded
by Venezuela, and the chimneys of a Czechoslovak electricity plant. To the south-
east lay the remains of a never-completed Soviet nuclear submarine base. Behind
me, where the bay met the sea, rose a mighty concrete structure that in the
1980s was due to become the Revolution’s greatest achievement. This, the contain-
ment building of Cuba’s first nuclear reactor, now appeared a hollow shell. As a
place, Cienfuegos seemed the product of complex socio-ecological relations that
at one time or another had converged in this exact location.
The revolutionary government turned its attention to Cienfuegos in the 1960s in
order to develop the country’s industrial capacity away from the Cuban capital. The
Havana Declarations of 1960 and 1962 asserted Cuba’s independence from the neo-
colonial world order, but the injustices of dependency could be remedied only by
© Cambridge University Press 2019. This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Journal of Latin American Studies (2019), 1–24
doi:10.1017/S0022216X19000920
of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022216X19000920
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. King's College London, on 04 Feb 2020 at 11:41:00, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
industrialising and urbanising the deprived regions.1 As architectural historian
Roberto Segre argues, the revolutionary leadership chose to neglect Havana and,
instead, to create a homogenous urban fabric across the island.2 In Fidel Castro’s
words, there would be ‘a minimum of urbanism and a maximum of ruralism’
when the Revolution transformed the country in its entirety.3 On Cuba’s southern
shores (Map 1), Cienfuegos became a key node in an international network that
would allow the country to develop under historically fair conditions.
Alongside Cuba’s spatial transformation, the revolutionary government devel-
oped a distinct mode of energy infrastructure in Cienfuegos. Echoing Lenin’s
maxim that ‘Communism is equal to Soviet power plus electrification of the
whole country’,4 it invested heavily in a unified national electricity system, powered
in the first instance by Soviet fuel oil. In the Cuban Marxist–Leninist reading of his-
tory, oil-based electricity was a material precondition for the nation’s transition to
communism. As Cuba reached higher levels of social development, however, oil
would give way to nuclear energy, epitomising the Revolution’s ability to transform
the techno-material base of the national economy. While Cuba established a
nuclear programme in 1976, starting work on a first reactor in 1983, nuclear devel-
opment at the same time took on a new urban form across the bay of Cienfuegos in
Ciudad Nuclear (Nuclear City).
This article examines the place of Cienfuegos and Ciudad Nuclear in the idea-
tional world of the revolutionary leadership and explores how the city developed
through industrial investments as part of the international socialist political econ-
omy. I draw on geographer Doreen Massey’s work to argue that cities should be
understood relationally, as places that form through actions and processes extend-
ing beyond them in space and time.5 Cienfuegos then serves as a prism for under-
standing the socio-political significance of urban change and energy development
as a single simultaneous process in the Cuban Cold War period. The focus on
Cienfuegos contributes to an understanding of the Cold War, where Cuba’s
national history is seen neither as ‘an extension of empire’ nor through the primary
lens of bipolar conflict.6 Cienfuegos also prompts us to look beyond the region’s
1Fidel Castro Ruz, ‘Discurso pronunciado … en la Magna Asamblea Popular celebrada por el pueblo de
Cuba en la Plaza de la República, el 2 de septiembre de 1960’, available at http://www.cuba.cu/gobierno/dis-
cursos/1960/esp/f020960e.html, last access 24 June 2019; Fidel Castro Ruz, ‘Discurso pronunciado … en la
Segunda Asamblea Nacional del Pueblo de Cuba, celebrada en la Plaza de la Revolución, el 4 de febrero de
1962’, available at http://www.cuba.cu/gobierno/discursos/1962/esp/f040262e.html, last access 24 June 2019.
2Roberto Segre, ‘Medio siglo de arquitectura cubana (1953–2003)’, Café de las Ciudades, 5: 40 (2006),
n.p.
3Fidel Castro Ruz, ‘Discurso pronunciado … al encontrarse con los integrantes de la marcha al Segundo
Frente “Frank País”, Pinares de Mayarí, el 26 de septiembre de 1966’, available at http://www.cuba.cu/
gobierno/discursos/1966/esp/f260966e.html, last access 11 June 2019. Translations of this and all other
quotations from the original Spanish are by the author.
4Vladimir I. Lenin, ‘Eighth All-Russia Congress of Soviets, 29 December’, in Collected Works, vol. 31, 4th
English edn (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1966 [1920]), pp. 517–18.
5E.g. Doreen Massey, ‘A Counterhegemonic Relationality of Place’, in Eugene McCann and Kevin Ward
(eds.), Mobile Urbanism: Cities and Policymaking in the Global Age (Minneapolis, MN: University of
Minnesota Press, 2011), pp. 1–14.
6Lillian Guerra, Visions of Power in Cuba: Revolution, Redemption, and Resistance, 1959–1971 (Chapel
Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2012), p. 4. On the call for Latin American perspectives on the
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major cities, the significance of which is frequently overemphasised in urban and
Latin American studies in view of their history as symbols of European power
and dominance.7 The city further brings alternative circulations of knowledge to
light in social science research on energy, a field that has mainly emerged from
research on a small set of countries in Western Europe and North America.8
Cuba’s joint urban and energy development demonstrates how leaders and
Map 1. Cienfuegos, Cuba
Source: G. Cederlöf, 2019
Cold War, see Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniela Spenser (eds.), In from the Cold: Latin America’s New
Encounter with the Cold War (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008); Tanya Harmer, Introduction
to ‘Virtual Special Issue: The Cold War in Latin America’, Journal of Latin American Studies (2018)
(https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-latin-american-studies/thematic-collections, last access
22 June 2019). On distinctly Cuban perspectives see Mona Rosendahl, Inside the Revolution: Everyday Life
in Socialist Cuba (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997); Guerra, Visions of Power in Cuba; Piero
Gleijeses, Visions of Freedom: Havana, Washington, Pretoria, and the Struggle for Southern Africa, 1976–
1991 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2013).
7Ananya Roy, ‘The 21st-Century Metropolis: New Geographies of Theory’, Regional Studies, 43: 6
(2009), pp. 819–30; Jamie Peck, ‘Cities beyond Compare?’, Regional Studies, 49: 1 (2015), pp. 160–82;
Jennifer Robinson, ‘Thinking Cities through Elsewhere: Comparative Tactics for a More Global Urban
Studies’, Progress in Human Geography, 40: 1 (2016), pp. 3–29. See Guadalupe García, Beyond the
Walled City: Colonial Exclusion in Havana (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2016), p. 11
for a discussion of the Latin American context in particular.
8Gavin Bridge, ‘The Map Is Not the Territory: A Sympathetic Critique of Energy Research’s Spatial
Turn’, Energy Research & Social Science, 36 (2018), p. 16; but see for example Stephen Gudeman, ‘Vital
Energy: The Current of Relations’, Social Analysis, 56: 1 (2012), pp. 57–73; Donald Kingsbury, ‘Oil’s
Colonial Residues: Geopolitics, Identity, and Resistance in Venezuela’, Bulletin of Latin American
Research, 35: 4 (2016), pp. 423–36; Marcus Power and Joshua Kirshner, ‘Powering the State: The
Political Geographies of Electrification in Mozambique’, Environment and Planning C: Politics and
Space, 27: 3 (2019), pp. 498–518, for important work on Latin America and (post)socialist states.
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planners attempted to enact social change through a radical spatio-infrastructural
transformation, aiming not only to break with the colonial past, but also to
bring nuclear modernity to the Caribbean. The effects of this transformation
today raise questions about the links between urban form, energy infrastructure
and political economy in Cuba’s Cold War and after.
From Urban Dependency to Urban Revolution
In the eighteenth century, Havana developed into Cuba’s all-dominating urban
centre. The capital city constituted a key node in the Spanish imperial economy.
In particular, control over Havana gave access to the transatlantic route along the
westerlies, allowing ships to sail from the Americas to Europe.9 When Spain ceded
Cuba to the United States in 1898, Havana retained its status as an outward-looking
colonial hub. Beyond its harbour, the city provided spaces for political and eco-
nomic administration over resource extraction in the sugar-producing hinterlands.
Within Cuba, the seasonal rhythm of the sugar industry meant that work was
abundant in the hinterlands during the labour-intense zafra (harvest). The dreaded
period between harvests, usually lasting from June to December, was known as the
tiempo muerto (dead period) and, to escape it, rural dwellers migrated to Havana in
search of jobs.10
To the revolutionary leadership, the tiempo muerto, urbanisation and Havana’s
primacy resulted from Cuba’s incorporation into the colonial world economy. ‘Do
you think that if we had had the possibility of starting to plan the entirety of this
country, we would have overindulged ourselves with a city as big as Havana?’,
Fidel Castro notably asked a crowd in Oriente Province in 1966. ‘Those enormous
urban concentrations are anti-economic’, he argued; ‘they are unaffordable; they are
enormous human concentrations’.11 In the metropoles, whether in Europe or North
America, urbanisation had been the product of industrialisation. In Latin America
and the Caribbean, by contrast, urbanisation resulted from colonial resource extrac-
tion serving the metropole’s industrial development. Without domestic industrial-
isation, Havana was draining Cuba’s rural areas of resources while large parts of
the urban population remained in poverty without employment.12 Among Latin
American dependency theorists more widely, this analysis gave rise to notions of
‘urban inflation’ and ‘overurbanisation’ whereby the ‘surplus of unproductive
population’ was destined to live in slums and work in the informal economy.13
9Alfred Crosby, Ecological Imperialism: The Biological Expansion of Europe, 900–1900, 2nd edn
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 127–8.
10García, Beyond the Walled City.
11Castro Ruz, ‘Discurso pronunciado … al encontrarse con los integrantes de la marcha al Segundo
Frente “Frank País”, … el 26 de septiembre de 1966’. The use of Fidel Castro’s speeches as primary sources
in this article is motivated less by their factual claims about historical events than by their importance for
reconstructing the revolutionary leadership’s ideational world. Even so, his speeches are often among the
best currently-available sources for accessing official statistics, as he would tirelessly review the ‘achieve-
ments’ of the Revolution in public appearances.
12David Barkin, ‘Confronting the Separation of Town and Country in Cuba’, Antipode, 12: 3 (1980),
pp. 31–40.
13Arturo Almandoz, ‘Urban Planning and Historiography in Latin America’, Progress in Planning, 65
(2006), p. 96; Aníbal Quijano, ‘Dependencia, cambio social y urbanización en Latinoamérica’, in Danilo
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Fidel Castro’s rebel army entered Havana in January 1959, and his new govern-
ment soon set up a Department of Physical Planning to oversee Cuba’s urban and
regional development. According to its first director, Felipe Préstamo, the intention
at this point was to focus on regions away from Havana.14 On the one hand, the
government sought to reduce the primacy of the capital in terms of economic activ-
ity and population growth. By turning away from it, the dependency relation
between Havana and its hinterlands would be broken, allowing the deprived regions
to develop. Addressing the International Organisation of Journalists in 1971, Carlos
Rafael Rodríguez, one of Cuba’s most senior government and Communist Party
officials, argued that Havana had been ‘the developed capital of an underdeveloped
country’. By the early 1970s, however, the government’s neglect of the capital,
counteracting the legacy of colonialism, was showing results: ‘That Havana no
longer exists and will never exist again. Our capital today is the stagnant capital
of a country in development.’15 Indeed, the government even attempted to ‘ruralise’
Havana. In the late 1960s, Fidel Castro urged the habanero population to farm the
Cordón de La Habana, a green belt around the capital, while the government cre-
ated large green urban spaces in Parque Lenin, the National Botanical Gardens and
the National Zoo, blurring the boundary between city and countryside. Fidel also
exhorted the urban populations to work in the cane fields to achieve a record
‘10-Million Tonne Zafra’ in 1970, which, despite great efforts, failed to reach its tar-
get.16 As Josef Gugler later concluded, the government’s intention to counteract the
urban growth of Havana reflected the view that it ‘represented the evils of old
society’.17
On the other hand, the government would create an integrated network of larger
and smaller urban areas, creating an evenly urbanised fabric across Cuba. Urban
centres would be linked in terms of economic planning and coordination, political
representation, cultural norms and, crucially, nation-spanning infrastructure. Paul
Susman argues that the goal of ‘urbanising the countryside’ meant that the state
would provide the population with services and other use values ‘consonant with
the social goals of improved service provision and enhanced equality’.18 In urban
Assis Clímaco (ed.), Cuestiones y horizontes: De la dependencia histórico-estructural a la colonialidad/des-
colonialidad del poder. Antología esencial (Buenos Aires: CLASCO, 2014 [1968]), pp. 75–124.
14Felipe Prestamo, ‘City Planning in a Revolution: Cuba, 1959–61’, Planning Perspectives, 8: 2 (1993),
pp. 188–212. See also Susan Eckstein, ‘The Debourgeoisement of Cuban Cities’, in Irving Louis
Horowitz (ed.), Cuban Communism, 5th edn (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1985), p. 97.
15Cited in ibid., p. 94, my emphasis.
16Reinaldo Funes Monzote, ‘Geotransformación: Geography and Revolution in Cuba from the 1950s to
the 1960s’, in Michael J. Bustamante and Jennifer L. Lambe (eds.), The Revolution from Within: Cuba,
1959–1980 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2019), pp. 132–3. Note that ‘ruralisation’ had very differ-
ent implications in the Cuban and Soviet contexts. In the Soviet Union, ruralisation was used to describe
the forced resettlement of peasants to cities during the Stalin period: see Stephen Kotkin, Magnetic
Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1998), pp. 107–8.
17Josef Gugler, ‘“A Minimum of Urbanism and a Maximum of Ruralism”: The Cuban Experience’,
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 4: 4 (1980), p. 521. Walking the streets of
Havana today, the effects of the government’s intentional neglect can still be traced in the urban landscape’s
dilapidated buildings and rundown infrastructure.
18Paul Susman, ‘Spatial Equality in Cuba’, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 11: 2
(1987), p. 233.
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areas, Cubans would have access to centralised electricity and water supplies, sew-
age treatment and telephone lines, hospitals and schools. While these were aspects
of revolutionary development that Fidel Castro had identified in his manifesto, the
Moncada Programme, he frequently reiterated that only national infrastructure and
urbanisation of the country’s interior could resolve the problems facing Havana,
breaking the spatiality of dependent urbanisation.19
Infrastructurally, the construction of the state rationing system distinguished
Cuba’s socialist urbanisation process from those in other countries. The govern-
ment devised the rationing system in 1962 to ensure distributional equality. Each
household received a ration card (libreta) and was entitled to a basket of foodstuffs
and consumer goods to be collected from an integrated system of ration shops
(bodegas). As infrastructural spaces for centralised redistribution, the bodegas con-
stituted moments not only in the production of urban space but also in the
nationally-integrated socialist state. With urban infrastructures, the state extended
its power to logistically implement political decisions, aiming to transform living
conditions throughout the country.20 As Sunila Kale has shown in the case of elec-
trification in independent India, electricity – on a par with the bodega – was ‘both
object of and mechanism for’ the formation of the socialist state in that it simultan-
eously symbolised and enabled socialist urban practice.21 Hardly by accident, the
Cuban census definition of urban areas came to be based as much on population
density as on the accessibility of urban infrastructures – socio-technically integrat-
ing and coordinating the socialist state.22
From the government’s point of view, the urban restructuring of Cuba would
accompany a transformation of the nation’s economic structure. After the
Revolution, urbanisation would be coincident with industrialisation. The territorial
extension of networked electricity infrastructure was essential to this task, as we
shall see, and the effects of industrialisation would be as much spatial as socio-
economic. When the state opened factories and educated the workforce, the
nation’s productive forces would develop, and workers would cluster in urban
areas. Factories would also generate work for deprived urban populations. In the
countryside, Fidel Castro urged small-scale farmers to move towards ‘superior
forms of production’ – shorthand for collectivisation and mechanisation.23
Entering successively larger social units, pooling mechanised resources, peasants
would become agricultural workers. Ultimately, the peasantry – regarded as an
19Fidel Castro [Ruz], La historia me absolverá (Edición anotada) (Havana: Oficina de Publicaciones del
Consejo de Estado, 2008 [1953]); Fidel Castro Ruz, ‘Discurso pronunciado … en la conmemoración del
XIII Aniversario del asalto al Cuartel Moncada, en La Habana, Plaza de la Revolución, el 26 de julio de
1966’, available at http://www.cuba.cu/gobierno/discursos/1966/esp/f260766e.html, last access 11 June
2019; Castro Ruz, ‘Discurso pronunciado … al encontrarse con los integrantes de la marcha al Segundo
Frente “Frank País”, … el 26 de septiembre de 1966’.
20Michael Mann, ‘The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results’, European
Journal of Sociology, 25: 2 (1984), pp. 185–213; see also Hillel Soifer and Matthias vom Hau, ‘Unpacking the
Strength of the State: The Utility of State Infrastructural Power’, Studies in Comparative International
Development, 43 (2008), pp. 219–30.
21Sunila Kale, Electrifying India: Regional Political Economies of Development (Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 2014), p. 10.
22Susman, ‘Spatial Equality in Cuba’, p. 229.
23José Alvarez, Cuba’s Agricultural Sector (Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press, 2004), pp. 41–4.
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archaic social class from ‘antes’, the epoch before the Revolution – would wither
away as the rural population became proletarians working for the state and,
hence, themselves as a national collective. At the same time, peasants would live
in successively denser, more urban areas, moving from chozas and bohíos (huts
and shacks) to modern, infrastructurally-integrated housing.24
To this end, two principal actions were taken. First, the government nationalised
all urban land, passing the Urban Reform Law in 1960. Nationalisation would allow
the state to plan urban land-use rationally instead of relying on the haphazard law
of value (i.e. market forces) for this historically essential task.25 At the same time,
the Urban Reform Law would reduce class-based urban differentiation, decreeing
that one nuclear family could own only one property and putting a cap on
rents.26 Second, the government gathered data to draw up plans for cities away
from Havana. Notably, they delegated to the Department of Physical Planning
the preparation of development plans for seven of Cuba’s secondary cities. From
east to west these were: Santiago de Cuba, Holguín, Camagüey, Santa Clara,
Cienfuegos, Matanzas and Pinar del Río.27
Susman argues that the new regional focus was successful in as much as migra-
tion to Havana slowed during the 1960s.28 Susan Eckstein also confirms this fact,
noting that Havana had the lowest growth rate of any Cuban city in terms of popu-
lation in the late 1960s, even though the growth rate had already started to decline
in the decade prior.29 With restricted economic resources, however, it proved dif-
ficult to replicate in other parts of the country the infrastructural and industrial
development that existed in the capital. ‘[T]he legacy of an “over-urbanized” past
continued to haunt the new regime’, Susman suggests.30 Though it had eradicated
class exploitation, Fidel Castro argued, the Revolution still suffered from the legacy
of dependent urbanisation:
If you analyse it, there is a very unequal distribution of resources in the nation,
because with man’s exploitation of man having disappeared or being in the
process of totally disappearing in the sense of existing proprietary classes
and dispossessed classes, we find ourselves with a sub-product of capitalist
exploitation, which is the exploitation of the countryside by the city.31
In 1969, as a result, Fidel Castro announced that his government would focus most
of its attention on three major regions with pre-existing infrastructure.32 New
24Ibid.
25See Helen Yaffe, Che Guevara: The Economics of Revolution (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009)
for a discussion of economic policy in revolutionary Cuba.
26Barkin, ‘Confronting the Separation of Town and Country in Cuba’, p. 33.
27Prestamo, ‘City Planning in a Revolution’.
28Susman, ‘Spatial Equality in Cuba’, p. 223.
29Eckstein, ‘The Debourgeoisement of Cuban Cities’, p. 93.
30Susman, ‘Spatial Equality in Cuba’, p. 223.
31Castro Ruz, ‘Discurso pronunciado … al encontrarse con los integrantes de la marcha al Segundo
Frente “Frank País”, … el 26 de septiembre de 1966’.
32David Slater, ‘State and Territory in Post Revolutionary Cuba: Some Critical Reflections on the
Development of Spatial Policy’, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 6: 1 (1982), p. 9;
Susman, ‘Spatial Equality in Cuba’, p. 224.
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industrialisation projects would be allocated to the provinces of Havana, Oriente
and Las Villas. Cienfuegos was the regional centre in Las Villas.
Industrialisation in Cienfuegos
Despite Havana’s primacy, Cienfuegos had developed into a regional economic
centre over the past century. The city was established by a group of French
émigrés from Louisiana in 1819 on the site of a former Taíno settlement.
Following the Haitian Revolution of 1791, the Caribbean saw a wave of white
migration from the formerly French colony east of Cuba. Louis Pérez Jr estimates
that up to 30,000 French settlers arrived in Cuba in the 1790s. Haiti (then Saint
Domingue) had been the world’s leading sugar colony for much of the eighteenth
century, so the French migrants brought with them capital and experience in sugar
and coffee farming. When Napoleon sold Louisiana to the United States in 1803 a
second wave of French migrants, in turn, set sail for Cuba. At this time, the Cuban
sugar industry was expanding fast, thriving in the calcareous clay soils of Las Villas
in particular.33
Cienfuegos, sited as it was by a deep-water bay, provided a protected space for
sugar shipments into the Caribbean Sea. When Las Villas’ largest town, Santa
Clara, was connected to Cienfuegos by rail in 1850, Cienfuegos turned into a
regional hub in the colonial export economy.34 The urban form of Cienfuegos
still reflects its historical role in the colonial political economy: the harbour consti-
tutes the city’s western perimeter, and the city pivots around a central plaza, the
Parque José Martí (prior to 1902, the Plaza de Armas), with a cathedral dedicated
to the Virgin Mary and the former offices of the colonial ayuntamiento (city council)
and merchant corporations (Figure 1). A pedestrian walkway, the Paseo de Prado,
extends north to south, forming a spine in a perfect orthogonal city grid. When
the town centre was nominated as a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 2005, the
application file argued that ‘[t]he city’s elegant and perfect neo-classical design,
with the shape of a chessboard which extends along its urban perimeter, constitutes
an exceptional exponent of the Cuban and the Caribbean 19th Century’.35
In the 1960s, Cienfuegos retained its role as a regional economic centre. Initially,
the revolutionary government had attempted to diversify the national economy,
identifying sugar monoculture as the source of Cuban underdevelopment. A return
to sugar, however, provided an immediate source of export revenue for the
financially-strained government.36 To blame a crop for the country’s underdevelop-
ment was also from a Marxist point of view to fetishise it, attributing agency to a
thing rather than to the social relations it embodied. Before long, the harbour in
Cienfuegos again constituted an essential outward-looking node in a global
33Louis A. Pérez Jr, Cuba: Between Reform and Revolution, 5th edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2015), pp. 55–6, 66.
34Oscar Zanetti and Alejandro García, Sugar and Railroads: A Cuban History, 1837–1959, trans. Franklin
W. Knight and Mary Todd (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1998).
35UNESCO, ‘Application File for the Nomination of Cienfuegos Urban Historical Center, Cuba’, file
1202, 2005, p. 5, available at http://whc.unesco.org/uploads/nominations/1202.pdf, last access 11 June 2019.
36See further Marifeli Pérez-Stable, The Cuban Revolution: Origins, Course, and Legacy, 3rd edn (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2011).
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network revolving around cane sugar. But now a radically different set of social
relations were seen to meet in this node, facilitating regional industrialisation
and urbanisation. Cuban sugar shipments were no longer destined for Spain or
the United States but for the Soviet Union and the member states of the Council
of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA).37
The Cuban government struck its first trade deal with the Soviet Union in
February 1960, including 900,000 tonnes of oil, which were estimated to save
Cuba US$ 24 million in one year. Facing US discontent, the Cuban government
argued that it was its right as a sovereign nation to trade with whomever they
liked, stressing that even US-aligned Brazil was trading with the Soviet Union.38
Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev was pursuing an export-oriented strategy at this
time, making use of the Soviet Union’s vast oil and gas resources to increase
Soviet influence in Asia, Africa and Latin America. While approaching Cuba, the
Soviets also offered generous trade deals to a range of countries in the Third
World, including Ceylon, India, Ghana, Argentina and Brazil.39
Cuban–Soviet commerce was established as a countertrade of oil and consumer
goods for sugar. Both parties argued that this agreement undermined the ‘unequal
exchange’ relations that otherwise existed between developed and underdeveloped
Figure 1. Parque José Martí, Cienfuegos
Source: G. Cederlöf, 2019
37The Soviet-dominated CMEA, also known as the COMECON or, in Spanish, CAME, coordinated
trade and cooperation between socialist states. After Cuba’s formal entry in 1972, the full members included
Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania and the Soviet
Union. Vietnam joined in 1978.
38‘Cuba revolucionaria ganará también la batalla de los abastecimientos’, Revolución, 6 July 1961, pp. 2,
4–7, 10; see Tobias Rupprecht, ‘Socialist High Modernity and Global Stagnation: A Shared History of Brazil
and the Soviet Union during the Cold War’, Journal of Global History, 6: 3 (2011), pp. 505–28 for an
account of Soviet–Brazilian relations during the Cold War.
39Arthur Jay Klinghoffer, The Soviet Union and International Oil Politics (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1977); Rupprecht, ‘Socialist High Modernity and Global Stagnation’; Noel Maurer, The
Empire Trap: The Rise and Fall of U.S. Intervention to Protect American Property Overseas, 1893–2013
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013), pp. 332–6.
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nations in the capitalist world economy. Unequal exchange entailed international
wage differences allowing industrialised countries to import a surplus of ‘value’,
representing labour time embodied in traded commodities. While this surplus
enhanced their development, agrarian nations were drained of value, which perpe-
tuated their underdevelopment.40 In the interest of advancing socialism globally,
Cuba and the Soviet Union would break this unjust market logic, establishing
equal-exchange relations through politically-defined terms of trade.
Symptomatically, the first major development in Cienfuegos after the Revolution
was a new harbour terminal, where raw sugar could be loaded in bulk to facilitate
trade with the socialist bloc. The ‘Tricontinental’ bulk sugar terminal opened in
1967 in an area known as O’Bourke, northwest of Cienfuegos’ historical centre.
The terminal’s name celebrated the Tricontinental conference that was held in
Havana the year before and posited the Cuban Revolution as a model for national
liberation and development across Asia, Africa and Latin America.41
The revolutionary government increasingly identified sugar as a vehicle for indus-
trialisation of the agrarian economy. Unusually for a crop, sugarcane lends itself well
to centralised production. Production requires a large mill (aptly known as a ‘central’
in Spanish) where cane stalks are crushed quickly to avoid fermentation.42 In Cuba,
Roberto Segre argues, the centrales were ‘true “factories” situated in rural areas’.43
Around them, company towns known as bateyes provided spaces for business
management and worker accommodation. Thus, the centrales – carrying urban
form through their bateyes – were a means to overcome the contradiction between
city and countryside.
While increasing the country’s export capacity, the ‘Tricontinental’ was also key
to the mechanisation of the sugar sector. In 1978, Fidel Castro inaugurated a similar
terminal in Las Tunas Province and explained that the ‘Tricontinental’ had served
the Cuban people in two ways. On the one hand, it had saved the country hard cur-
rency as bulk loading removed the need for sugar sacks, which had to be imported
from abroad. Over the past decade, more than 10 million tonnes of sugar had been
loaded in Cienfuegos; Fidel Castro estimated that this equalled around 50 million
unspent pesos in hard currency on sack purchases.44 On the other hand, the mech-
anisation of sugar loading had saved Cuban workers hundreds of thousands of
hours of hard labour. Sugar sacks had to be carried, but bulk loading was auto-
matic. In a capitalist society, Fidel argued, mechanisation would have taken labour
time away from the worker, the machine competing with the worker for labour. But
40Arghiri Emmanuel, Unequal Exchange: A Study of the Imperialism of Trade, trans. Brian Pearce
(New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972).
41John A. Gronbeck-Tedesco, ‘The Left in Transition: The Cuban Revolution in US Third World
Politics’, Journal of Latin American Studies, 40: 4 (2008), p. 660. O’Bourke was the name of an Irish family
which had settled in Cienfuegos as plantation owners in the nineteenth century, some of whose members
participated in the anti-colonial struggle.
42See James C. Scott, Seeing like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have
Failed (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998), p. 396 n. 17 on sugar production and centralisation.
43Roberto Segre, Arquitectura y urbanismo de la Revolución Cubana (Havana: Editorial Pueblo y
Educación, 1989), p. 55.
44Fidel Castro Ruz, ‘Discurso pronunciado … en el acto de inauguración de la terminal de azúcar a
granel de Puerto Carupano, provincia de Las Tunas, el 20 de enero de 1978, año del XI festival’, available
at http://www.cuba.cu/gobierno/discursos/1978/esp/f200178e.html, last access 11 June 2019.
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in socialist Cuba, the machines in the ‘Tricontinental’ had instead liberated Cuban
harbour workers from hard labour as the machines were put to use in the workers’
own interest. ‘That is what socialism entails’, Fidel explained; ‘that when a technol-
ogy is introduced it is not to enslave the worker, it is not to exploit the worker, it is
not to make the worker redundant, but to help him. And so, the technology liber-
ates thousands of our harbour workers from that hard labour.’45 Indeed, in the
ideational world of the revolutionary leadership, more advanced productive forces
generated ‘development’ by freeing the Cuban population from the need to work
through mechanisation and automation.
Still, the ‘Tricontinental’ was only one of many industrial facilities that opened in
and around Cienfuegos between the late 1960s and the late 1980s. While the colo-
nial economy had converged on Havana, Cienfuegos and southern Las Villas were
now at the centre of the revolutionary economy. Two features characterised the new
investments. First, several facilities increased the economy’s dependence on sugar-
cane. A torula factory in Covadonga and a fertiliser plant in O’Bourke provide tell-
ing examples. Covadonga is a batey approximately 50 km west of Cienfuegos; torula
is a protein-rich yeast that would be used as feed in the chicken runs around
Cienfuegos. The torula factory opened in 1977 and, at its inauguration, Fidel
Castro reported that the plant would employ 111 workers and produce 40 tonnes
of yeast per day.46 They had located the factory at the site of a large central, the
‘Antonio Sánchez’. To grow torula, workers would allow bacteria to ferment cane
syrup (miel) deriving from the mill. Production also required water, ammonium
phosphate and urea, the two latter products deriving from the fertiliser plant in
O’Bourke, which was of British origin.47 In a chronicle of Cienfuegos’ industrial
history, the Cuban media outlet Radio Rebelde relates how the fertiliser plant
discharged ‘yellow smoke into the air’ for the first time in 1974.48 Before long,
however, the machinery broke down. Fidel asserted that ‘all the defects and …
all the botched jobs [chapucerías] of the English in that plant’ were to blame.49
Production resumed only in 1978, and by then, both the torula and the fertiliser
plant were tied into an economy that overwhelmingly relied on sugar exports.
Usefully, torula was a domestic source of edible proteins via poultry farming, but
it relied on a continuous supply of cane syrup, thereby increasing Cuba’s reliance
on sugar monoculture.
Second, the new industries strengthened Cuba’s relations with the CMEA. As
exemplified in the fertiliser case, many factories were imported from abroad to
45Ibid. See also Ariana Hernández-Reguant, ‘The Inventor, the Machine, and the New Man’, in
Jacqueline Loss and José Manuel Prieto (eds.), Caviar with Rum: Cuba–USSR and the Post-Soviet
Experience (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), pp. 199–210.
46Fidel Castro Ruz, ‘Discurso pronunciado … en el acto de inauguración de la planta para elaborar leva-
dura torula, construida en el Central “Antonio Sánchez”, Cienfuegos, efectuado el 29 de julio de 1977’,
available at http://www.cuba.cu/gobierno/discursos/1977/esp/f290777e.html, last access 11 June 2019.
47Ibid.
48Mireya Ojeda Cabrera, ‘En Cienfuegos desarrollo industrial tras huella de Fidel’, Radio Rebelde, online
edition, 4 June 2012, http://www.radiorebelde.cu/noticia/en-cienfuegos-desarrollo-industrial-tras-huella-
fidel-20120604/, last access 24 June 2019.
49Fidel Castro Ruz, ‘Discurso pronunciado … en el acto de amistad cubano canadiense, efectuado en la
planta de azúcar a granel “Tricontinental”, en Cienfuegos, el 28 de enero de 1976’, available at http://www.
cuba.cu/gobierno/discursos/1976/esp/f280176e.html, last access 11 June 2019.
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establish domestic industrial capacity. In 1984, the Cuban leader noted that ‘52
industrial developments [obras] … such as sand washers, stone crushers, tile and
concrete block factories, electricity substations’ had been assembled in Cienfuegos
Province since the Revolution.50 Radio Rebelde recorded that these ranged from a
dairy plant in Cumanayagua and the torula plant in Covadonga to facilities for
wheat milling, mineral-water bottling and floor-tile production.51 Most of the indus-
trial units came from fellow socialist countries. One of the largest of these factories –
the ‘Carlos Marx’ – would produce cement. Situated by a large limestone formation
in Guaibaro, just outside Cienfuegos, the ‘Carlos Marx’ was imported from the
German Democratic Republic and, to this end, its government reportedly provided
Cuba with a 60-million-peso credit, to be repaid over ten years at 2 per cent interest.
Cuba had to start repaying the credit as soon as the first of three production lines
became active.52 The cement would primarily be used for housing construction in
Cuba to meet the demand for urban accommodation.53
East German leader Erich Honecker visited Cienfuegos for the inauguration of
the ‘Carlos Marx’ cement factory, during which Fidel Castro stressed how favour-
able a deal the factory was for the Cuban population: ‘See for yourselves what mag-
nificent terms of credit, what magnificent financial conditions for building this
factory.’54 If Cuba had imported the plant from a capitalist country, as in the
case of the fertiliser plant, it would have suffered from unequal exchange. In the
revolutionary understanding of international political economy, Cuba no longer
had to suffer from unequal exchange when it integrated its economy with the
CMEA countries. According to Fidel, trade on preferable terms with already indus-
trialised countries in the socialist bloc, such as Honecker’s East Germany, allowed
Cuba to develop its economy under historically fair conditions: ‘The development
of these relations gives more solidity to our economy, it makes it less dependent on
the Western markets, on the highs and lows and on the crises of this market; it
makes it much less dependent on the unequal exchange that we have with the cap-
italist world.’55 The Revolution therefore made Cuba an exceptional country in
Latin America, having escaped the yoke of unequal exchange. The ‘Carlos Marx’
cement factory in Cienfuegos testified to this historical feat.
Industrialisation also brought with it urban change. Fidel Castro argued that
construction workers played a crucial role in Cuba’s transformation as ‘they have
50Fidel Castro Ruz, ‘Discurso pronunciado … en el acto central por el XXXI aniversario del asalto al
Cuartel Moncada, efectuado en la ciudad de Cienfuegos, el 26 de julio de 1984, “Año del XXV aniversario
del triunfo de la Revolución”’, available at http://www.cuba.cu/gobierno/discursos/1984/esp/f260784e.html,
last access 2 July 2019. In 1976, Las Villas was split into three smaller provinces – Cienfuegos Province
being one of these – as the government institutionalised the Revolution via a new constitution.
51Ojeda Cabrera, ‘En Cienfuegos desarrollo industrial tras huella de Fidel’.
52Fidel Castro Ruz, ‘Discurso pronunciado … en la inauguración oficial de la fábrica de cemento “Carlos
Marx”, en Guaibaro, Cienfuegos, el 29 de mayo de 1980, “Año del Segundo Congreso”’, available at http://
www.cuba.cu/gobierno/discursos/1980/esp/f290580e.html, last access 11 June 2019.
53Castro Ruz, ‘Discurso pronunciado … en el acto de amistad cubano canadiense …, el 28 de enero de
1976’; Castro Ruz, ‘Discurso pronunciado… en el acto central por el XXXI Aniversario del asalto al Cuartel
Moncada …, el 26 de julio de 1984’.
54Castro Ruz, ‘Discurso pronunciado … en la inauguración oficial de la fábrica de cemento “Carlos
Marx” …, el 29 de mayo de 1980’.
55Ibid.
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transformed the physiognomy of the country’.56 Alongside Cienfuegos’ factories,
construction workers were building aqueducts and sewers; they were putting up
houses and shops, libraries, hospitals and schools. Urban change was most clearly
to be seen in the regional cities. Many of these had seemed like small villages
(aldeas) before the Revolution, Fidel explained. To speak of construction at that
time was ‘to speak about the fifth wheel of the car’ (i.e. an optional extra). The poli-
ticians of the pre-revolutionary era had invested in a few small construction works
during the tiempo muerto, when the people begged them for employment. But now,
with the triumph of the Revolution, and ‘the necessity to develop all the land’, the
country had finally established a modern construction industry with thousands of
construction workers.57 Indeed, in the mid-1980s, the growth of Cienfuegos was ‘a
reflection of the Revolution in the entire country’, generating development away
from the parasitical capital. And yet, while Cienfuegos could pride itself on its
great industrial development, there were still many things that Cienfuegos lacked
in comparison to other cities. The pre-revolutionary past made itself felt as capit-
alism and colonialism had left ‘a situation of great inequality, not only social
inequality, but inequality between regions’.58
The urbanisation process was also visible in the statistical yearbooks. According
to the Cuban censuses of 1970, 1981 and 2002, the proportion of urban dwellers in
Cienfuegos Province increased from 27.2 to 31.5 to 35.6 per cent between cen-
suses.59 Arianna Rodríguez García, too, concludes from Cuban demographic data
that the provincial population living in urban settlements of more than 200 inha-
bitants increased from 8.85 to 32.3 per cent between 1981 and 2002.60 In Cuba
overall, the urban population grew only marginally from 1960 to 1970 – from
58.4 to 60.3 per cent – but then increased markedly, with 68.1 per cent estimated
to live in urban areas in 1980 and 73.4 per cent in 1990.61
The Nuclear Revolution
In the 1980s, Cienfuegos was the scene of the largest industrial project the country
had witnessed thus far: the construction of a nuclear power plant in Juraguá at the
mouth of Cienfuegos bay. Framed as ‘La Obra del Siglo’ (‘The Project of the
Century’), the Juraguá plant would have four reactor generator units, each with a
capacity of 417 MW. In the first instance, the government proceeded to build
two reactors, construction starting on the first in 1983 and the second in 1985.
56Fidel Castro Ruz, ‘Discurso pronunciado … en el acto de inauguración de la Termoeléctrica “Carlos
Manuel de Céspedes”, celebrado en ocasión de conmemorarse el Día del Constructor. Cienfuegos, 5 de
diciembre de 1978, Año del XI Festival’, available at http://www.cuba.cu/gobierno/discursos/1978/esp/
f051278e.html, last access 11 June 2019.
57Ibid.
58Castro Ruz, ‘Discurso pronunciado … en el acto central por el XXXI Aniversario del asalto al Cuartel
Moncada …, el 26 de julio de 1984’.
59Oficina Nacional de Estadística e Información (ONEI), Anuario estadístico de Cienfuegos 2015
(Havana: Oficina Nacional de Estadística e Información, 2016), tables 3.1, 3.15.
60Arianna Rodríguez García, ‘Análisis de la evolución de los asentamientos de la provincia de
Cienfuegos. 1981–2002–2012’, Novedades en Población, 12: 24 (2016), p. 123.
61United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), World Urbanization
Prospects: The 2014 Revision (New York: UNDESA, Population Division, 2014), file 2.
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The power plant was part of a larger nuclear programme according to which four
more reactors would eventually operate in Holguín Province and another four in
Pinar del Río. One day, Cuba would rely on nuclear fission alone for electricity
generation.62 Electrification, in turn, was critical to the successful infrastructural
integration of Cuba. With a centrally-controlled national grid, industrial production
would not be geographically limited to places with energy resources on site but
could be ‘rationally’ developed by the socialist government without concern for
limited energy supplies.
The reactors’ design was the Soviet VVER-440. ‘VVER’ was the Russian acronym
for water–water energy reactor, meaning that pressurised water would be used to
cool and moderate the reactor core. The ‘440’ implied that the reactors would
have an electrical capacity of 440 MW. Cuba nonetheless opted for a plant with sev-
eral non-standard features for the reactor type. Model V-318 would have contain-
ment buildings to prevent radioactive fallout in the case of a meltdown. The
buildings would also be resistant to the shockwave from a direct aircraft hit. As
Cienfuegos was located in a seismically active area, moreover, the reactors were
designed to withstand earthquakes. The plant was sited at only 17 metres above sea-
level, which would ensure that, even in the event of a tsunami, it would have a con-
tinuous supply of cooling water.63 The likelihood of a tsunami forming in the
Caribbean Sea was one in 10,000 years, according to Fidel Castro, and, in govern-
ment discourse, the precautions taken even in this regard attested to the high level
of safety characterising the project.64 As a result of these features, the reactors
would have a lower electrical output than the standard Soviet model.
Nuclear power again resonated with the belief in technology as a liberating force,
which would bring socialist development to Cuba. The nuclear plant would develop
the country’s productive forces in one leap, thrusting Cuba on to a higher stage of
techno-material development. Fidel Castro had already suggested in the Moncada
Programme that nuclear energy would allow a progressive government to electrify
the entire country, ‘given that the application of nuclear energy is now a reality in
this branch of industry’.65 In 1984, he boasted that the first reactor then under con-
struction in Juraguá would have a greater capacity on its own than that of the whole
combined electrical industry prior to the Revolution.66 In all of Latin America, only
Argentina and Brazil had successfully developed nuclear capacity with their
Atucha, Embalse and Angra plants.67 Thus, the nuclear reactors in Juraguá testified
62Fidel Castro Ruz, ‘Discurso pronunciado … en el acto de clausura del Primer Fórum Nacional de
Energía celebrado en el teatro “Carlos Marx”, el 4 de diciembre de 1984, “Año del XXV aniversario del
triunfo de la Revolución”’, available at http://www.cuba.cu/gobierno/discursos/1984/esp/f041284e.html,
last access 11 June 2019.
63Fidel Castro Díaz-Balart, Nuclear Energy: Environmental Danger or Solution for the 21st Century?
(Turin: A. M. Arti Grafiche, 2005), pp. 312–13.
64Castro Ruz, ‘Discurso pronunciado … en el acto central por el XXXI Aniversario del asalto al Cuartel
Moncada …, el 26 de julio de 1984’.
65Castro, La historia me absolverá, p. 53.
66Castro Ruz, ‘Discurso pronunciado … en el acto central por el XXXI Aniversario del asalto al Cuartel
Moncada …, el 26 de julio de 1984’.
67Emanuel Adler, ‘State Institutions, Ideology, and Autonomous Technological Development:
Computers and Nuclear Energy in Argentina and Brazil’, Latin American Research Review, 23: 2 (1988),
pp. 59–90.
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to the progress the Revolution brought not only to Cuba, but also to Central
America and the Caribbean.68
It is important to remember that the modernisation process essentially had the
same material characteristics when Cuba followed the Soviet development model as
when it followed the US example in the early twentieth century. As Paul Josephson
reminds us, engineers and politicians in the Soviet Union and the United States fre-
quently looked to each other to make sure they were on the right ‘development’
track.69 From the Marxist-Leninist point of view, the difference between capitalist
and socialist development was that modern technology entered into qualitatively
different social relations in the two Cold War blocs. Under capitalist relations of
production, more advanced productive forces increased the exploitation of the
working class; under socialism, they contributed to the liberation of the proletariat.
Materially, however, mechanisation, electrification and automation were neutral
features of an imminent nuclear modernity.70
In his study of the Cuban nuclear programme, the US-based scholar Jonathan
Benjamin-Alvarado suggests that the Cuban leadership pursued the project above
all for the sake of international prestige.71 However, the Executive Secretary of
the Cuban Atomic Energy Commission (CEAC) argued that Cuba ought to be
entitled to nuclear power as a sovereign nation.72 Nuclear technology represented
the most advanced material base of any developed nation, and nuclear power
was a historical necessity for the development of Cuba’s productive forces. The
Executive Secretary referred to above was Cuba’s leading nuclear physicist, Fidel
Castro Díaz-Balart, who also happened to be the Cuban leader’s eldest son.
Fidelito, as he was known, was appointed to lead the development of both electrical
nuclear capacity and radiochemical applications in the pharmaceutical and agricul-
tural industries. Under the purview of the CEAC, Cuba would develop a standalone
nuclear industry that would ultimately be independent of foreign technicians and
advisers.73 For the time being, however, the project was unthinkable without
Soviet support. ‘Only within the framework of cooperation between the socialist
countries is it possible for a country like Cuba to undertake this giant project’, a
propaganda film from TeleNuclear, aired on Cuban television in the 1980s, made
clear.74
Besides the nuclear plant, the government was developing Cienfuegos into a hub
in the energy sector. While Fidel Castro had identified nuclear energy as the
68Castro Ruz, ‘Discurso pronunciado … en el acto central por el XXXI Aniversario del asalto al Cuartel
Moncada …, el 26 de julio de 1984’.
69Paul R. Josephson, Industrialized Nature: Brute Force Technology and the Transformation of the
Natural World (Washington, DC: Island Press, 2002).
70See further Gustav Cederlöf, ‘Thermodynamics Revisited: The Political Ecology of Energy Systems in
Historical Perspective’, in Raymond L. Bryant (ed.), The International Handbook of Political Ecology
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2015), pp. 646–58.
71Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado, Power to the People: Energy and the Cuban Nuclear Program (New York:
Routledge, 2000), pp. 76–7.
72Fidel Castro Díaz-Balart, ‘La energía nuclear en Cuba: Factor imprescindible para el desarrollo’, Boletín
del OIEA, 1 (1990), p. 52.
73See further ibid.; Castro Díaz-Balart, Nuclear Energy.
74TeleNuclear, ‘CEN Juraguá: La obra del siglo’, documentary film, n.d., available at https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=orCr4iBnsBU, last access 11 June 2019.
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definitive solution for electricity generation, electrification had proceeded based
almost exclusively on fuel-oil combustion since 1959. Prior to the Revolution, the
Florida-based Compañía Cubana de Electricidad had supplied electricity generated
in oil-fired thermoelectric power plants, albeit primarily to white, affluent urban
areas. At that time, three multinational companies – Standard Oil of New Jersey
(Esso), Texaco and Royal Dutch Shell – delivered fuel oil to the Compañía via
their refineries in Havana and Santiago de Cuba. In 1960, however, the
Eisenhower administration urged the refineries to cease operations, following the
Cuban leadership’s trade deal with the Soviet Union for complementary oil
imports.75 As the conflict escalated into a US oil blockade, the revolutionary gov-
ernment nationalised the refineries along with the Compañía Cubana de
Electricidad, the Cuban Telephone Company and 36 sugar mills on 30 August
1960. Soon, the United States’ blockade developed into the more general trade
embargo against Cuba. Fortunately for the Cuban revolutionaries, the Soviet
Union agreed to fill the supply gap left by the United States by exporting oil in
exchange for sugar on terms that undermined unequal exchange.
Subsequently, the Cuban government invested heavily in thermoelectric gener-
ating technology to facilitate industrialisation and automation. In the late 1960s,
new power plants opened in Mariel, Santiago de Cuba and Nuevitas with Soviet
technology. In O’Bourke, the nationalised utility synchronised the ‘Carlos
Manuel de Céspedes’ thermoelectric plant with Cuba’s western grid in 1978. The
plant’s first two units – this time imported from Czechoslovakia – each had a cap-
acity of 66 MW, and the plant was later expanded with two generators from Japan,
each of which was rated at 169 MW.76 A short distance from the power plant, the
government also sited a new oil refinery to be built with Soviet support in the
course of the 1980s. It was the largest industrial project in the region apart from
the nuclear plant.77 The refinery’s bayside location would facilitate Cuban petrol-
eum exports (resulting from the refining of Soviet crude oil), but the fuel oil coming
out of it could conveniently be used in the ‘Carlos Manuel de Céspedes’ thermo-
electric plant down the road.78
Hence, in the energy sector too, Cienfuegos entered into in a network of socio-
ecological relations with international reach: the Cuban Ministry of Sugar (MINAZ)
exported sugar produced in the Las Villas area, in part via the ‘Tricontinental’ load-
ing terminal in O’Bourke. In return, the Soviet Union sent crude oil to Cuba’s
refineries. When complete, the refinery in Cienfuegos would be a key node in
this trade network. MINAZ then used oil products of various kinds in its mills,
cane harvesters and lorries, while the nationalised electricity company burned
fuel oil in its thermoelectric plants to provide electricity for industrial and residen-
tial use. Cuba’s industrialisation in general, and Cienfuegos’ in particular, thus was
75Maurer, The Empire Trap, pp. 314–27.
76Castro Ruz, ‘Discurso pronunciado … en el acto de inauguración de la Termoeléctrica “Carlos Manuel
de Céspedes” … 5 de diciembre de 1978’.
77Castro Ruz, ‘Discurso pronunciado … en el acto central por el XXXI Aniversario del asalto al Cuartel
Moncada …, el 26 de julio de 1984’.
78Castro Ruz, ‘Discurso pronunciado … en el acto de inauguración de la Termoeléctrica “Carlos Manuel
de Céspedes” … 5 de diciembre de 1978’.
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ever more closely interwoven with sugar monoculture and Cuba’s relations with the
Soviet Union.
Here, however, the nuclear power plant would play a highly strategic role
in the eyes of the revolutionary government. The propaganda film from
TeleNuclear asserted that the plant would ‘represent a qualitative change in the
national energy system’.79 By substituting enriched uranium for oil, the nuclear
reactors would reduce the need for oil imports significantly. With four reactors
in Juraguá, Fidel Castro estimated that the plant would displace up to 2.4 million
tonnes of fuel oil per year.80 This would again transform the geometry of social
and ecological relations converging in Cienfuegos. Reduced oil dependence
would allow the Cuban government either to cut back its oil imports, diminishing
its dependence on the Soviet Union, or to re-export Soviet oil for hard currency
on the international markets.81 Fidel reasoned that nuclear energy would thus
enhance Cuba’s development.82 More widely, Sonja Schmid argues that the
European CMEA states that also imported Soviet nuclear technology – notably
East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Hungary – saw it as a means of
reducing their dependence on oil and gas imports from the Soviet Union. The
Soviet government, by contrast, regarded nuclear transfer as a way to ‘strengthen
inner-bloc ties and to further demarcate their sphere of influence’.83 Schmid sug-
gests that this contradiction was resolved in the socialist countries’ shared belief
in advanced nuclear technology as an essential material base for historical
progress.
Cienfuegos in the Nuclear Cold War
Cienfuegos’ position as a nuclear city made it a centre of contestation in the bipolar
Cold War. Given Cuba’s geopolitical role following the Crisis de Octubre
(the Cuban Missile Crisis), Cienfuegos developed what Gabrielle Hecht would
call dangerous ‘nuclearity’ in the eyes of the United States. Nuclearity is a socially-
contingent practice whereby a place or object is designated as ‘nuclear’, with
political implications.84 In this regard, the construction of the Juraguá plant was
not the first project to confer nuclearity on Cienfuegos.
In August 1970, aerial photographs from a US reconnaissance mission indicated
that Cuba was building a new naval facility on Cayo Alcatraz, a small island in the
south of Cienfuegos bay. Next to a set of barracks, the photographs also showed a
football field. To the CIA’s analysts this constituted an inconsistency: Cubans
79TeleNuclear, ‘CEN Juraguá’.
80Castro Ruz, ‘Discurso pronunciado … en el acto de clausura del Primer Fórum Nacional de Energía …
4 de diciembre de 1984’.
81Jorge Pérez-López, ‘Cuban Oil Reexports: Significance and Prospects’, The Energy Journal, 8: 1 (1987),
pp. 1–16.
82Castro Ruz, ‘Discurso pronunciado … en el acto de clausura del Primer Fórum Nacional de Energía …
4 de diciembre de 1984’.
83Sonja D. Schmid, ‘Nuclear Decolonization?: Soviet Technopolitics in the Second World’, in Gabrielle
Hecht (ed.), Entangled Geographies: Empire and Technopolitics in the Global Cold War (Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, 2011), p. 133.
84Gabrielle Hecht, Being Nuclear: Africans and the Global Uranium Trade (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
2012).
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played baseball, not football. Russians did, however. Previously, in July 1969 and
again in May 1970, Soviet Foxtrot and Echo-II class submarines had called at
Cienfuegos to be serviced by accompanying tenders. When two barges arrived
with equipment to dispose of radioactive waste from submarines in September
1970, the United States raised the issue to a matter of top-level diplomacy.85
Evidence suggested that the Soviet Union was building a base for missile-carrying
nuclear submarines. On 25 September 1970, the Soviet Ambassador to Washington
received a note from President Richard Nixon stating that the United States
regarded Soviet actions as a possible breach of the ‘understanding’ reached after
the 1962 Missile Crisis.86 This understanding implied that the United States
would refrain from invading Cuba, as long as the Soviet Union withdrew all offen-
sive weapons from the island.
The Cienfuegos crisis was largely resolved through informal conversations
between Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin and US Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger. Now-declassified memoranda from these exchanges show that an oral
agreement was reached on 6 October to honour the understanding from 1962.
Even so, the Soviet government insisted on its navy’s right to periodically visit
Cienfuegos, or any other port, in accordance with international maritime law.
Kissinger admitted that this was a right the United States hardly could deny
them.87 Despite the agreement, the Soviet Union continued to tender submarines
in Cienfuegos. In February 1971, they serviced a November-class nuclear attack
submarine, and the conflict heated up again. At this point, Kissinger forwarded a
new note from Nixon stating that submarine tenders had been in or around
Cienfuegos for 125 of the past 166 days and that the United States saw this as a
breach of their mutual understanding.88 The Soviet Union then withdrew their
nuclear submarines and tenders and Cienfuegos’ status as a place of nuclearity
waned.
In April 1986, however, when construction had already started on the reactors in
Juraguá, disaster struck at the ‘V. I. Lenin’ nuclear power plant in Chernobyl.
Critics in the United States soon suggested that the Juraguá plant was a ‘Cuban
Chernobyl’ in waiting. In the case of a reactor meltdown, they estimated that radio-
active fallout would create ‘serious ecological damage as far north as Tampa,
Florida’, not to mention in the Cuban archipelago.89 Cubans who had been
involved in the construction works, but emigrated in the 1990s, also reportedly
claimed that essential welding jobs had been poorly carried out and constituted a
safety threat.90 By contrast, Fidel Castro Díaz-Balart insisted on the power plant’s
safety. On the one hand, the Chernobyl reactors had a completely different design
from the Juraguá plant, as they used graphite rather than pressurised water to
85Asaf Siniver, ‘The Nixon Administration and the Cienfuegos Crisis of 1970: Crisis-Management of a
Non-Crisis?’, Review of International Studies, 34 (2008), pp. 73–4.
86Edward C. Keefer, David C. Geyer and Douglas E. Selvage (eds.), Soviet–American Relations: The
Détente Years, 1969–1972 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2007), memos
83–4.
87Ibid., memos 85–6, 97.
88Ibid., memos 123–6.
89Benjamin-Alvarado, Power to the People, p. 73.
90Ibid., pp. 73–5.
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moderate the reactor core. The Cuban reactors would also have containment build-
ings. On the other hand, two plants with pressurised-water reactors were already
operating at Turkey Point and Saint Lucie in Florida. In the southern states of
Tennessee, the Carolinas, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia and Florida, 35 plants
of a similar design were already in active use. Despite this, Fidelito argued, only
Juraguá was – unfairly – being designated a possible nuclear hazard.91
Ciudad Nuclear
While the nuclear programme epitomised Cuba’s efforts at industrialisation, it also
had specific urban form. Just east of the reactor construction site, the Cuban gov-
ernment developed a new housing zone as part of the project (Figure 2). Initially,
construction workers, engineers and welders lived in Ciudad Nuclear. Once the
reactors were operational, the ‘city’ would house power-plant workers. A workers’
town was of course no anomaly in the Cuban landscape but an integral dimension
of the urbanisation process. Bateyes had been built alongside sugar mills since colo-
nial times, and a purpose-built ‘university city’, Ciudad Universitaria José Antonio
Echeverría (CUJAE), was constructed on the outskirts of Havana in the early 1960s
to house students.92 While building a nuclear power plant with Soviet support, it
was also logical to create a workers’ town. Soviet state architects often developed
new cities next to heavy-industrial extraction sites. The Stalinist steel city of
Magnitogorsk is the most emblematic example;93 Pripyat, overlooking the reactors
in Chernobyl, the most notorious.
While the nuclear power plant would thrust Cuba on to a higher stage of techno-
logical development, Ciudad Nuclear also represented a break with the past. If
Cienfuegos’ urban form represented a ‘colonial space’ in the dependency lexicon,
Ciudad Nuclear constituted a space of and for the Revolution and its emerging
nuclear modernity.94 The city was set out along two parallel thoroughfares. Most
buildings would have five floors and were built with the Yugoslav IMS construction
technology. First, a prefabricated skeleton of reinforced concrete was set in place for
each building; then slabs were hoisted into place to constitute interior walls and a
façade, leaving space for prefabricated stairs, balconies and other design features.
The Revolution’s first major housing project, Ciudad Camilo Cienfuegos in
Habana del Este, had been built largely with non-industrial techniques, but prefab-
rication was employed on a large scale to build the Distrito José Martí in Santiago
de Cuba in the late 1960s. Prefabrication then became increasingly prevalent in the
1970s, when Cubans received paid leave to work in housing construction as part of
the so-called Microbrigadas (worker collectives for the construction and communal
distribution of housing).95
The IMS system was named after the Institut za Ispitivanje Materijala (Institute
for the Testing of Materials), where it was developed in the 1940s and 1950s. The
91Castro Díaz-Balart, Nuclear Energy, pp. 291–2.
92Segre, Arquitectura y urbanismo de la Revolución Cubana, pp. 95–9.
93Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain.
94Manuel Castells, ‘La urbanización dependiente en América Latina’, Planificación, 8 (1973), pp. 1–18.
95Eckstein, ‘The Debourgeoisement of Cuban Cities’, pp. 102–3; Segre, Arquitectura y urbanismo de la
Revolución Cubana, pp. 184–90.
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IMS would facilitate the reconstruction of the newly socialist but war-torn
Yugoslavia with industrial precision and efficiency and was notably used by the
planners of New Belgrade (Novi Beograd) for housing construction. Again, the
vision of modernity’s materiality crossed the ideological divide of the Cold War.
Rooted in the thought of Le Corbusier and the International Congresses of
Modern Architecture (CIAM), New Belgrade engendered the same high-modernist
planning ideals that were espoused by planners and politicians from Brasilia to
Tashkent and Chandigarh.96 In Yugoslavia, the IMS system was soon promoted
as an export asset.97 An IMS factory in Cienfuegos opened in 1978 with a reported
capacity of 1,500 dwelling units per year. In Ciudad Nuclear, the revolutionary
government planned for 4,500 units.98
Compared to colonial Cienfuegos, Ciudad Nuclear had a qualitatively different
city plan. The housing complexes congregated around a cultural centre, with a pub-
lic library, bookshop and professional theatre company. As in all Cuban revolution-
ary cities, the centralised infrastructure of the socialist state would be present: not
only public electric lighting, aqueducts and sewers, but also bodegas for the distri-
bution of food rations, a polyclinic, a pharmacy, primary and secondary schools, a
day-care centre and a post office. The CEAC also established the short-lived
Juraguá Electronuclear Polytechnic University, which focused on nuclear physics
Figure 2. Workers’ Housing in Ciudad Nuclear
Source: G. Cederlöf, 2019
96Scott, Seeing like a State; Vikramaditya Prakash, Chandigarh’s Le Corbusier: The Struggle for Modernity
in Postcolonial India (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 2002); Paul Stronski, Tashkent: Forging
a Soviet City, 1930–1966 (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2010).
97Jelica Jovanović, Jelena Grbić and Dragana Petrović, ‘Prefabricated Construction in Former Yugoslavia:
Visual and Aesthetic Features and Technology of Prefabrication’, in Stephanie Herold and Biljana
Stefanovska (eds.), 45+ Post-War Modern Architecture in Europe (Berlin: Technische Universität Berlin,
2012), pp. 179–87.
98Castro Ruz, ‘Discurso pronunciado … en el acto de inauguración de la Termoeléctrica “Carlos Manuel
de Céspedes” … 5 de diciembre de 1978; Castro Ruz, ‘Discurso pronunciado … en el acto central por el
XXXI Aniversario del asalto al Cuartel Moncada …, el 26 de julio de 1984’.
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and radiochemistry.99 Thus, as in the Soviet steel city of Magnitogorsk, a socialist
subjectivity and the embodied experience of an approaching, if fraught, modernity
were fashioned in Ciudad Nuclear.100 Representing the ideals of the Cuban
Revolution, Ciudad Nuclear constituted a built environment for modern, educated
socialist citizens. It was also an interpersonal meeting place seen to reinforce social
relations between Cuba and the CMEA countries. In 1984, for example, Fidel
Castro noted that 5,500 Cubans were living in Ciudad Nuclear alongside 188
Soviet and 82 Bulgarian engineers.101 In the shadow of the materialising reactor
domes, a qualitatively new urban society was emerging. At least, so it seemed in
the grand narrative of the Cuban Revolution.
An Interrupted Nuclear Modernity
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Cuba lost not only its closest political ally,
but also its main trading partner. Boris Yeltsin’s Russian government demanded
renegotiation of the Soviet Union’s bilateral agreements, including the contracts
for the Juraguá plant. In September 1992, Fidel Castro announced that the nuclear
programme would be suspended indefinitely.102 Cuba, now suffering from unequal
exchange, could no longer afford the Russian technology. At the same time, Russia
required Cuba to purchase oil and sell sugar at world-market prices. Between 1989
and 1993, Cuba’s imports of crude oil declined by 86 per cent, as Fidel Castro
declared that the country had entered a ‘Special Period in Peacetime’.103 The
refinery in O’Bourke opened in 1991 but had to close again four years later due
to a lack of crude supply. In and around Cuba’s centrales, production ground to
a halt. Las Villas’ sugar fields lay fallow, deprived of synthetic fertilisers and pesti-
cides, and industrial machinery was lifeless without diesel, fuel and lubricant oils.104
As work stopped on the nuclear reactors, construction of Ciudad Nuclear ended
abruptly. While people still live in the urban enclave across the bay – both Cubans
and a few remaining Russians – many buildings were never finished. Abandoned to
the elements, some are today in danger of collapse. In defence of the nuclear pro-
gramme, Fidel Castro Díaz-Balart noted that approximately 1,300 Cubans had
graduated as nuclear physicists from the Juraguá Electronuclear Polytechnic and
99Castro Díaz-Balart, Nuclear Energy, pp. 291–2.
100Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain.
101Castro Ruz, ‘Discurso pronunciado … en el acto central por el XXXI Aniversario del asalto al Cuartel
Moncada …, el 26 de julio de 1984’.
102Fidel Castro Ruz, ‘Discurso pronunciado … en el acto por el XXXIX Aniversario del asalto al Cuartel
Moncada y el XXXV del levantamiento de Cienfuegos, efectuado en Cienfuegos, el 5 de septiembre de 1992,
“Año 34 de la Revolución”’, available at http://www.cuba.cu/gobierno/discursos/1992/esp/f050992e.html,
last access 11 June 2019.
103Oficina Nacional de Estadísticas (ONE), Estadísticas energéticas en la Revolución (Havana: ONE,
2009), table 14; on the ‘Special Period’ see e.g. Fidel Castro Ruz, ‘Discurso pronunciado… en el acto central
por el XXX aniversario de los Comités de Defensa de la Revolución, efectuado en el Teatro “Carlos Marx”,
el 28 de septiembre de 1990’, available at http://www.cuba.cu/gobierno/discursos/1990/esp/f280990e.html,
last access 24 June 2019.
104Walfrido Alonso-Pippo, Carlos A. Luengo, John Koehlinger, Pietro Garzone and Giacinto
Cornacchia, ‘Sugarcane Energy Use: The Cuban Case’, Energy Policy, 36: 6 (2008), pp. 2163–81.
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Soviet universities by 1992.105 Yet there was no nuclear plant where they could put
their knowledge to work. Their high-modern city, a long distance from the Cuban
capital, was falling into decay. In large numbers, Cubans from Cienfuegos and pro-
vinces further east migrated to Havana during the Special Period in search of
employment, ‘a process that mirrors migration flows in pre-revolutionary Cuba’,
Alejandro de la Fuente notes. With 92,000 Cubans applying for residential status
in Havana in the spring of 1997, the government banned all migration to the capital
as unemployed newcomers often ended up living in ‘subhuman conditions’.106
In the past decade, however, Cienfuegos has seen renewed investment. In 2007,
Cuba’s then-acting President Raúl Castro and Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez
re-inaugurated the oil refinery following extensive retrofitting, making Cienfuegos a
key node in PetroCaribe. PetroCaribe, a regional oil-trading bloc dominated by
Venezuela and Cuba, was established in 2005 to overcome the challenges faced by
the Caribbean’s island-states, given their heavy oil-import dependence and low pur-
chasing power on the world market – unequal exchange, in other words.107 Cuban–
Venezuelan joint venture Cuvenpetrol S.A. (founded in 2006) operated the refinery,
which constituted the single largest project to integrate the Cuban and Venezuelan
national economies since the mid-2000s. Furthermore, in 2007, Cuban families
moved into a new residential area north of O’Bourke, named Reparto Simón Bolívar,
where the Venezuelan government had donated prefabricated buildings as part of
PetroCaribe’s social programmes.108 The process of socialist urbanisation found new
material expression in Reparto Simón Bolívar, again tied to a historically-specific
form of energy development. The houses here are petrocasas, so-called ‘oil homes’,
made from the plastic polyvinyl chloride (PVC) produced by the Venezuelan petro-
chemical industry to derive social benefits from the country’s oil wealth.109
Despite this upswing, Cienfuegos’ place is shifting again in the geometry of
wider political–economic relations. In August 2017, the Cuban government
re-nationalised the refinery, reportedly responding to Venezuela’s failure to pay
for services incurred under the PetroCaribe agreement.110 Cuba has also looked
105Castro Díaz-Balart, Nuclear Energy, p. 292.
106Alejandro de la Fuente, ‘Recreating Racism: Race and Discrimination in Cuba’s “Special Period”’,
Socialism and Democracy, 15: 1 (2001), p. 85.
107PetroCaribe, ‘I Cumbre’, Puerto La Cruz, Venezuela, 29 June 2005, and ‘Acuerdo de Cooperación
Energética PetroCaribe’, http://www.granma.cu/granmad/secciones/petrocaribe/cumbres-cel/acuerdo-1.
html and http://www.granma.cu/granmad/secciones/petrocaribe/cumbres-cel/celeb-1.html, last access 11
June 2019; see further Conor Harrison and Jeff Popke, ‘Reassembling Caribbean Energy? Petrocaribe,
(Post-)Plantation Sovereignty, and Caribbean Energy Futures’, Journal of Latin American Geography, 17:
3 (2018), pp. 212–34; Gustav Cederlöf and Donald V. Kingsbury, ‘On PetroCaribe: Petropolitics,
Energopower, and Post-Neoliberal Development in the Caribbean Energy Region’, Political Geography,
72 (2019), pp. 124–33.
108Julio Molina, ‘Raúl y Chávez inauguran petrocasas cienfuegueras’, Granma, online edition, 21 Dec.
2007, available at http://www.granma.cu/granmad/secciones/petrocaribe/de-la-iv-cumbre/art37.html, last
access 11 June 2019; Cederlöf and Kingsbury, ‘On PetroCaribe’, pp. 129–30.
109Elvin Delgado, ‘Conflictive Energy Landscapes: Petrocasas and the Petrochemical Revolution in
Venezuela’, in Stefan Bouzarovski, Martin J. Pasqualetti and Vanesa Castán Broto (eds.), The Routledge
Research Companion to Energy Geographies (London: Routledge, 2017), pp. 330–46.
110Sarah Marsh and Marianna Parraga, ‘Cuba Takes over Venezuela Stake in Refinery Joint Venture’,
Reuters, 14 Dec. 2017, available at https://www.reuters.com/article/cuba-venezuela/cuba-takes-over-vene-
zuela-stake-in-refinery-joint-venture-idUSL8N1OE79H, last access 11 June 2019.
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for new sources of oil as the Bolivarian Revolution in Venezuela has entered what
may be a terminal state. In a process unfolding in parallel to PetroCaribe, then,
Cienfuegos was declared a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 2005, to the benefit
of the Cuban tourism industry, for the reasons noted above. While UNESCO states
that the city constitutes an ‘outstanding example’ of modernist urban planning, this
refers not to the concrete slabs of Ciudad Nuclear or the plastic walls of Reparto
Simón Bolívar, but to the colonial modernity of Cienfuegos’ nineteenth-century
town centre.111 Cienfuegos is today an important way station on the circuit for
Western tourists, whose purchasing power allows them to take advantage of
Cuba’s low-wage economy.
Conclusion
The rationale behind the policy for urban restructuring and centralised energy
development emerged from a critique of the colonial political economy.
Embedded in the pursuit of nuclear modernity, it also took on distinct urban
form. Ciudad Nuclear represented an article of faith in infrastructural integration,
centralised redistribution and automated technology powered by oil and nuclear
energy as determinants of social progress. However, Cuba’s spatio-infrastructural
transformation was contingent on relations extending beyond its cities in space
and time.112 Ideationally, Cienfuegos’ Cold War development was a success as
long as Cuba was taking part in qualitatively different, equal-exchange relations
with the CMEA. The government’s inability to sustain these relations after the col-
lapse of the Soviet Union suggests that Cuba’s nuclear modernity ultimately was a
failure, a failure manifested in the decay of Ciudad Nuclear and the ruins of the
reactors in Juraguá. Despite this, Cienfuegos’ vital position in the revolutionary
economy invites us to look beyond Havana and Latin America’s major cities if
we want to understand the Cold War in the region. Cienfuegos brings circulations
of knowledge to light that broaden the ‘geographies of theory’ in urban, energy and
Latin American studies.113 The city’s history demonstrates the significance and dif-
ficulty of achieving alternative, possibly more equitable, urban forms in Cuba and
beyond.
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Spanish abstract
Durante la Guerra Fría, La Habana simbolizó la lucha por la liberación nacional en
Latinoamérica. Ahora bien, las visiones de desarrollo de la Revolución Cubana se materi-
alizaron, como en pocas otras partes, en la sureña ciudad de Cienfuegos. Este artículo
examina por qué dos reactores nucleares a medio terminar y una decaída ‘ciudad nuclear’
111UNESCO, ‘Urban Historic Centre of Cienfuegos’, 2005, available at http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/
1202, last access 2 July 2019.
112Massey, ‘A Counterhegemonic Relationality of Place’.
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permanecen hoy en Cienfuegos. A través de una transformación integral del espacio y la
infraestructura de Cuba, el gobierno revolucionario buscó remediar los males de la depen-
dencia y el intercambio desigual. Cienfuegos, y su cambiante lugar en la economía política
de la Guerra Fría, demuestran cómo una crítica radical de la urbanización se fusionó con
la espacialidad de una infraestructura de energía centralizada para perseguir una moder-
nidad nuclear que al final fracasó. La historia de Cienfuegos conduce el ojo académico más
allá de las ciudades principales de Latinoamérica para ampliar las geografías de la teoría
sobre los estudios urbanísticos, los de energía y sobre América Latina.
Spanish keywords: urbanización; energía nuclear; infraestructura; intercambio desigual; Revolución
Cubana; Guerra Fría
Portuguese abstract
Durante a Guerra Fria, Havana simbolizava a luta pela libertação nacional na América
Latina. E mesmo assim, como em poucos outros lugares, a visão de desenvolvimento
da Revolução Cubana se materializou na cidade sulista Cienfuegos. Este artigo examina
as razões pela qual dois reatores nucleares não acabados e uma ‘cidade nuclear’ em
decomposição ainda permanecem em Cienfuegos hoje. Através de uma ampla
transformação espacial e estrutural de Cuba, o governo revolucionário buscou remediar
os males da dependência e da troca desigual. Cienfuegos, e o seu lugar mutante na eco-
nomia política da Guerra Fria, mostra como uma crítica radical de urbanização se uniu
com a espacialidade de infraestrutura de energia centralizada em busca de uma moderni-
dade nuclear, que por fim não deu certo. A história de Cienfuegos atrai o olhar acadêmico
para fora das maiores cidades da América Latina com o intuito de ampliar as geografias de
teoria em estudos urbanos, de energia e estudos da América Latina.
Portuguese keywords: urbanização; energia nuclear; troca desigual; Revolução Cubana; Guerra Fria
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